ABSTRACT. Truth-maker analyses construe truth as existence of proof, a well-known example being that offered by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. The paper subsumes the intuitionistic view of truth as existence of proof under the general truth-maker scheme. Two generic constraints on truth-maker analysis are noted and positioned with respect to the writings of Michael Dummett and the Tractatus. Examination of the writings of Brouwer, Heyting and Weyl indicates the specific notions of truth-maker and existence that are at issue in the intuitionistic truth-maker analysis, namely that of proof in the sense of proof-object (Brouwer, Heyting) and existence in the nonpropositional sense of a judgement abstract (Weyl). Furthermore, possible anticipations in the writings of Schlick and Pf~tnder are noted.
which can best be seen as an attempt at giving content to the metaphors involved in the so called correspondence theory o f truth, z
In general, a truth-maker analysis is given in terms o f three items, namely, 
Leibniz's Satz v o m G r u n d e provides a case in point:
A true proposition is one where the predicate is contained in its subject, or, more generally, whose consequent is contained in its antecedent, and it is therefore necessary that there should be some connexion between notions of the terms, i.e. that there should be an objective foundation from which the reason for the proposition can be given, or, an a priori proof can be found. 3
Here the truth-bearer is a proposition in the oldf a s h i o n e d sense, that is, a judgement o f subject/copula/ predicate form
S i s P
Leibniz construes all truth, whether necessary or contingent, as analytic. The proposition is true when the predicate is contained in the subject, such containment being made evident from a certain ground, or reason, namely a possibly infinite a p r i o r i proof o f the judgement in question, consisting o f (possibly infinite) resolutions of the concepts S and P into primitive components. A truth o f reason has a finite proof, whereas the resolution proceeds to infinity in the case o f a truth of contingent fact. The truth-maker is this a priori proof and the relevant notion o f existence is resolvability (in the mind of God). Modern truth-maker analyses were offered in the early parts o f the present century by Husserl, Moore, and Russell, using as truth-makers, for example, facts, complexes and Sachverhalte. The most elaborated of these modern attempts, surely, is that presented by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. 4 .
The particular properties of a given truth-maker analysis will obviously depend on the three specific choices made as to the truth-bearers, their truth-makers, and the appropriate mode of existence for the chosen truthmakers. Clearly, in view of the rich variety of truthmaker analyses that has been offered, one cannot expect to establish too many general theses, applicable to any truth-maker analysis, from the very formulation of the generic truth-maker scheme itself.
In the Dummett passage quoted above, the link between truth-and meaning-theoretical issues is faced squarely from the outset, and the meaning of a sentence is, of course, commonly formulated in terms of truth conditions. These, on the other hand, are given in terms of a notion of truth that is construed according to the truth-maker analysis in question. Therefore, on the hypothesis that meaning is given in terms of truth conditions, the truth-maker analysis will be subjected to meaning-theoretical constraints. Such constraints, then, provide further conceptual structure which might enable us to formulate some general insights concerning the truth-maker analysis of truth.
.
One remark concerning truth-maker analyses that can be made bears on the application of the notion of identity to truth-bearers. An appropriate notion of identity for truth-bearers can be obtained without effort given the truth-maker analysis. An identity criterion is readily formulated in terms of the truth-makers:
A is the same truth-bearer as B iff the truth-maker categories T M A and TM B coincide An alternative, essentially equivalent choice would be to use instead:
A is the same truth-bearer as B iff every truth-maker for A is a truth-maker for B, and vice versa.
When the truth-bearers are propositions, the above constitutes a simple solution to the old Quinean challenge of providing a criterion of identity for propositions.
A second general point can be made concerning the notion of existence that is involved in a meaningtheoretically constrained truth-maker analysis. Here the meaning of a sentence A is laid down in terms of its truth condition A is true.
Thus, on pain of a vicious regress of ever-descending meaning-explanations, the predicate • . . is true cannot be propositional in nature. In other words, it is not a propositional function formulated in the language from which the sentences are taken whose meaning is explained using the predicate in question. When combined with the truth-maker analysis this yields the result that the existence involved in such an analysis is not that of the existential quantification
It must be observed first that there is no such thing as the meaning of this quantifier independently of its occurrence in existential propositions; on the contrary, the meaning of the quantifier is explained as part of the existential proposition having such and such a truthcondition. Furthermore, the proper form of the quantification is
since the usual, model-theoretic explanation of the semantics of the quantifier suppresses the domain of quantification, owing to the separation of syntax and semantics. Here when the quantified formulae express propositions, rather than serve as the formal objects of metamathematical study, the domain of quantification has to be explicitly included. The meaning of the existential quantifier 3 is accordingly explained in terms of the conditions under which (3x ~ D)P(x) is true.
On the truth-maker analysis this truth condition is analysed as:
there exists a truth-maker for (3x ~ D)P(x).
If the existence involved here were itself to be expressed by means of an existential quantifier, firstly, in order that the quantifier be applicable, the relation of truth-making between the truth-maker and the true proposition would have to be a propositional function. Secondly, an infinite regress would arise:
(3z e the category of truth-makers for (3x
D)P(x))
[the relation of truth-making obtains between z and the proposition (3x e D)P(x)], since the first existential quantifier 3z has yet again to be expressed in terms of the truth-condition for an existentially quantified proposition, and so on. Thus, the notion of existence at issue here is not that of the existential quantifier. Accordingly, also the status of the relation of truth-making between the truth-bearer and the truth-maker is sub judice and one cannot expect it to be that of a propositional function: if it were, it would immediately combine with the existential quantifier to yield a proposition of the rejected, regress-infested type.
. Phenomena related to, or originating in, this unusual status of the relation of truth-making have been noted by Dummett in his comments on an argument for the undefinability of truth, that is, against the possibility of a general characterization of the concept of truth. The argument runs roughly as follows:
In order to find the condition for a proposition p to be true, a general characterization of truth is applied to p. is true, then this knowledge must involve knowing what it is, in general, for a sentence.., to be true. To know this is neither necessary or sufficient to know, of every particular sentence, under what conditions it is true. It must, rather, involve knowing how in all cases the concept of truth is related to that of meaning. To be more exact, we ought here to speak of an implicit grasp of the connection between the concepts of meaning and of truth, rather than of a knowledge of it. 6
This connection between meaning and truth can take either of two forms. It is direct when meaning is given in terms of truth. The connection will be mediated when meaning is ultimately given in terms of another notion. In this second case, as Dummett rightly notes, there has to be a uniform manner of deriving the notion of truth from the latter notion in terms of which meaning is then ultimately explained:
we need to distinguish between a feature of an expression which is dependent upon its meaning and one that is actually part of that meaning. This distinction underlies our intuitive inclination to take the meaning as something we confer on an expression . . . . .
If some feature of an expression is merely dependent on its meaning, then it did not have to be conferred and cannot be altered; that is, it cannot be altered without altering something else to which it is responsible, and from which it derived. If, however, it is actually part of the meaning, then, in the sense in which it is we who make our words mean what they mean, we could alter it without there being anything else which we should, as it were, have to alter first] In Dummett's terminology, the condition for a sentence to be true will be dependent on the meaning of the sentence in question, but it will not be part of that meaning. Meanings are then, ultimately, given in terms of truth-makers and it is the relevant truth-maker that is part of the meaning of the sentence. The truth-maker scheme provides a "general characterisation of that feature (i.e. truth G.S.) in terms of whichever other feature has been chosen as that by means of which the meaning is given (i.e. the relevant notion of truth-maker G.S.) . . . . This characterisation will constitute a uniform manner of deriving the former from the latter. ''8
.
Consider a truth-maker analysis of sentential truth. The above points made by Dummett can then be recast using terminology derived from Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In that work, the primary category of truth-bearer is that of an elementary proposition (Elementarsatz). (Other truth-bearers, namely the objects of the category of propositions, are obtained recursively from the elementary propositions by means of (generalized) truthfunctional combinations. For the purpose of the present discussion of the Tractatus, I will use the term "proposition" for the elementary propositions.) The propositional sign, which is itself a fact in the world, is made into a symbol, with meaning, by being placed in an internal projective relation to the world, which associates simple names with objects. has to be the case if it is to be true. What has to be the case, if it is to be true, it is possible to determine from the symbol itself, by virtue of its being a symbol: internal properties and relations can be read off from the symbols themselves, and the relation between proposition and state of affairs is an internal one. Whether, on the other hand, the proposition is indeed true, whether what has to be the case if the proposition is to be true is in fact the case, is not internal to the symbol, but is something which can be found out, if at all, only by comparing the proposition with the world. On this Tractarian truth-maker analysis of truth and meaning, the category of truth-makers corresponding to a proposition is the singleton category consisting solely of the state of affairs presented by the proposition in question, and when this state of affairs obtains the proposition is true (4.25).
Finally, let us note that the truth-maker analysis offered in the Tractatus does agree with the above two general points concerning truth-maker analyses. In accordance with the first point concerning the truthmaker definability of truth-bearer identity, the presented state of affairs does determine the (sense of the) elementary proposition (4.2-4.21). In this connection, also the following theses, concerning the sense of the (complex) proposition, rather than just that of the elementary proposition, are highly congenial:
I will give the name truth-grounds of a proposition to those truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that make it true. (5.101c)
If he truth-grounds that are common to a number of propositions are at the same time truth-grounds of a certain proposition, then we say that the truth of that proposition follows from the truth of the others. (5.11)
If p follows from q, the sense of 'p' is contained in the sense of
Finally, in accordance with the second, meaningtheoretically constrained general point, we should note that the notion of existence appropriate to states of affairs, namely that of obtaining, is not that of the existential quantifier: the latter is explained as a generalized truth-function of elementary propositions (5.52) and, as such, it already presupposes the notion of existence involved in the obtaining of the states of affairs.
Turning now to the general truth-maker scheme, Wittgenstein's terminology can profitably be transposed also to this context. What a truth-maker for a certain truth-bearer has to be, can be read off from the truthbearer sign itself; the relation between the proposition and its category of truth-makers is internal. Similarly, when the truth-bearer is made true by a given truthmaker, the connection between truth-maker and truthbearer is internal. Whether there exists a truth-maker or not, is not internally given in the proposition, but can only be determined through external research, that is, through a comparison with the world. In the Tractatus, when the truth-maker exists, that is, when the presented state of affairs obtains, the relation between this fact (that is, obtaining state of affairs) and the proposition is again an internal one. Thus, also in the Tractatus, two internal relations are at issue here: first, the relation between the proposition and its category of truth-makers and, secondly, the relation between the true proposition and its truth-maker. 9 The application of the relevant notion of existence for the truth-makers is not internal to the proposition, however; in general, as we now know, truth can be read off from the symbol alone only in the exceptional case of tautological truth-functional combinations of propositions at the level of the propositional calculus. 1°
. The intuitionistic conceptions of meaning and truth that I consider here were made explicit around 1930 by Brouwer's first pupil, Arend Heyting, then a secondary school-teacher at Enschede in the eastern parts of the Netherlands. 11 In this section I wish to summarize his views in order to show that his intuitionistic conception closely follows the general pattern set out above. 12 We have three notions to consider: the truth-bearers, the truth-makers corresponding to a given truth-bearer and the notion of existence appropriate to the truth-makers.
The notion of truth-bearer chosen by Heyting is that of a proposition (French (1) proposition, German (2) a proposition corresponds to a proof.
In the primary sense, a proof, or perhaps better, a demonstration, is the (mental) act whereby the individual mathematician gets to know the truth of a certain proposition. The object of such an act of demonstration is the theorem proved that the proposition in question is true. These acts, proofs in the subjective sense, when completed, have no further existence, but they may leave tracks or traces. These traces, or proofs in the objective sense, are what we find written down in mathematical texts and what may be used by other mathematicians to carry out proofs in the subjective sense for the same theorem. 15 These are not the proofs that are at issue in the intuitionistic truth-maker conception. Brouwer, in his famous demonstration of the Bar Theorem, introduced a novel notion of proof, namely proofs as mathematical objects. The German term used is that of a Beweisfiihrung. From Brouwer's practice it is clear that his Beweisfiihrungen are objects; they are named, restricted and transformed in much the same way as functions or well-founded trees are, as the following extracts show:
"the proof h shows for an arbitrary element of ~ that is securable," "Let hsn~ . . . nr be the specialization of h that derives the securability of the element Fsnl . . . hr." "an arbitrary proof, when the connections used in it are decomposable into basic connections, can always (at least at the expense of brevity) be 'canonized' in such a way that its canonical form uses basic connections only" "On the basis Of a transfinite induction along fsnl • . . nr we see further that at every stage of the proof kSnl ... nr.
• .,, 16 The proofs intended by Heyting in the meaning explanations are also of this nature:
A proof of a proposition is a mathematical construction which can itself be treated mathematically. 17
Furthermore: every proposition, according to HEYTING, stands for the intention towards a mathematical construction that should meet certain conditions. A proof of a proposition consists in the actualization of the construction it demands. 18
That the constructions intended in/demanded by propositions have to be mathematical objects is brought out quite clearly by the very first example offered by Heyting:
A proposition p, for example, "Euler's constant is rational" expresses a problem, or better still, a certain expectation (that of finding two integers a and b such that C = a/b) that can be realised or disappointed) 9 What is demanded (intended, expected) by the proposition (problem, expectation, intention) is a certain mathematical object (a mathematical construction which can itself be treated mathematically), that satisfies certain conditions, depending on the proposition in question. The truth of the proposition is demonstrated by constructing a proof-object that meets the relevant conditions as determined by the proposition. Thus, in summary, we have to distinguish between (i) proof-acts (demonstrations), (ii) proof-traces, and (iii) proof-objects.
It is the third notion that serves as truth-maker for the mathematical proposition on the intuitionistic conception o f meaning and truth, and it is essential to recall this when disambiguating the formulations used in contemporary writings within the philosophy o f mathematics. As already noted above, the object o f an act o f demonstration is the theorem proved. W h e n it is made fully explicit, the theorem has the form a is a proof (-object) o f A, where the construction a is the object o f an act o f construction. A n alternative, but, in the light o f the preceding discussion, essentially equivalent, rendering is: a is a truth-maker for A.
With these formulations it is possible to make at least some sense o f a couple o f remarks o f Wittgenstein's:
What is proved by a mathematical proof is set up as an internal relation and withdrawn from doubt• Proof must show an internal relation, not an external one] ° On the above analysis, the internal relation shown by a proof (-act, demonstration) is that between truth-maker and truth-bearer, that is, between proof-object and mathematical proposition. The chosen truth-bearer/truth-maker relation of intuitionism is not original with intuitionism as we saw. Heyting transformed a w e l l -k n o w n connection from within the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l tradition, namely that between Intention and Erfiillung, by choosing the latter to be certain mathematical objects, which we now call proof-objects. The notion o f existence appropriate to the chosen truth-maker relation is genuinely intuitionistic, though. Michael D u m m e t t writes:
Hilbert's way of constructing arithmetical propositions involving quantification over all natural numbers concedes to them a great deal of informative content: it merely denies that they are statements assessable as true or false . . . . For any particular natural number, say 103, the proposition "A(103)" is then uncontroversially an informative statement. The existential proposition "For some n, A(n)" is taken by Hilbert to be an incomplete communication of any particular such instance: one is entitled to enunciate it if one knows of any specific number of which one can show that it satisfies the predicate "A( )".
The intuitionists in effect accepted Hilbert's characterization of the meanings of the existential and universal quantifiers, but denied that statements formed by means of them were incapable of being subjected to negation or the other sentential operators. For them it was necessary only to explain the sentential operators in the same manner, rather than by truth-tables: that is, to give the meanings of the sentential operators by specifying, for each operator, what would justify the assertion of a statement of which it was the principal operator. 2~
Irrespective o f its possible systematic merits, considered as a piece o f history, this does not get matters quite right. The intuitionists did not have to borrow this notion of existence from the formalists; on the contrary, they took it ready made from within their own tradition. 22
The term "incomplete c o m m u n i c a t i o n " used by D u m m e t t to describe the formalist attitude to the existential proposition derives in this context from Kleene. 23 It was used by him in conjunction with the term "partial judgement", simply as a translation o f the German used by Bernays in Hilbert-Bernays:
An existential proposition regarding numerals, that is, a proposition of the form "there is a numeral n with the property A(n)", is finitistically to be taken as a "partial judgement", that is, as an incomplete communication of a further determined proposition, 24 The incomplete communication seems to be Bernays's own contribution. Partial judgement, though, goes back to Hilbert:
In general, an existential proposition has, from a finitist point of view, only meaning as a partial proposition, that is, as part of a further determined proposition, whose precise content is inessential for many applicationsY
In an earlier article, Hilbert had already referred to the problem o f negating the existential proposition and summarized the position as follows:
For finite totalities "there exists" and "there is available, at hand" mean the same; for infinite totalities only the latter concept is clear at o n c e . 26
This, however, is not the genesis o f the formalist's view that existence leads to truncated non-propositional claims. Hilbert took this notion from his apostate pupil Hermann Weyl.
Weyl had strong philosophical interests, especially geared towards phenomenology, and in 1918 he responded to the crisis in the foundations of mathematics with his predicativist manifesto Das Kontinuum. 27 In the summer of 1919, Weyl had personal contact with Brouwer in Switzerland, where he got a private crash 9. course of tutorials in intuitionism from the master himself. 28 The result was dramatic: Weyl decided to jettison his own project and to join forces with Brouwer. This he did publicly in a series of provocative lectures, Uber die neue Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik, delivered at Ziirich in 1920. Here, in his exposition of basic intuitionistic principles, Weyl introduced some novelties:
An existential Proposition -for instance, "there is an even number" -is not at all a proper judgement that expresses a state of affairs; Existential states of affairs are an empty invention of logicians. "2 is an even number": that is a real judgement that expresses a state of affairs; "there is an even number" is only a judgement-abstract that has been obtained from this judgement. 29
This -Weyl's judgement abstract -then, is the formalist's source for his incomplete communication. Thus, as stated above, it is not in agreement with the facts to say that the intuitionists obtained their notion from the formalists. On the contrary, they already had it) ° Recently Per Martin-L6f has given a streamlined version of this notion of existence. 31 When ct is a category, a general concept, then tx exists is a judgement. Which judgement it is, is explained by telling what knowledge is expressed by, or in, the judgement in question. In other words, the judgement is explained by telling what knowledge one has to have in order to have the right to make it. Here, in order to have the right to make the judgement o~ exists, it is required that one has made some judgement Notes a : 13(, 32 that is, in order to ascribe existence to a general concept one has to know an object falling under the concept in question.
In conclusion, then, one should note that also in the present intuitionistic case, the notion of existence that is involved in the truth-maker analysis, namely the Weyl-Hilbert conception of existence-claims as elliptical, or truncated,
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judgements, is clearly non-propositional in nature. Accordingly, it is different from the existential quantifier.
The notion of truth that is applicable to intuitionistic propositions, finally, can now be pieced together from the notion of proof-object and the notion of existence: the proposition A is true the concept pro@object of A exists.
It should be noted that what has been explained here is the notion of truth simpliciter. This is the primary notion of truth that is involved at the most basic level, for instance in the formulation of a consequence A 1 t r u e , . . . , A~ true ~ C true.
Since consequences can also hold between propositions which are in fact not true, we see here that from the very formulation A true of a proposition's being true simpliciter, it does not follow that the desired proof-object is there to be found. As Martin-L6f has explained, the intuitionist needs to distinguish between this notion of truth simpliciter, potQntial truth, when a proof-object can be found, and actual truth, when a proof-object has been found. 33 I have dealt with a number of the resulting complexities at some length elsewhere and accordingly I here confine myself with a reference to Martin-L6f's original paper and my own earlier remarks. 34 * The present paper was written during a sabbatical leave while visiting the Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, I am indebted to the Department, as well as to the Wenner-Gren Foundation, Stockholm, for financial support that made the visit possible. Per Martin-L6f read the paper in manuscript and suggested a number of improvements. Unless otherwise indicated the English translations are my own. 1 Elements oflntuitionism, Oxford U. P., 1977, p. 6. 2 Michael Dummett considers the principle C(correspondence):
If a statement is true, there must be something in virtue of which it is true, Ogden & Richards and Russell consider that the relation of proposition to fact is an external relation; this is not correct. It is an internal relation. (An internal relation cannot be otherwise; it is given in terms of the terms involved, in the nature of proposition and fact.) On Russell's view you need a tertium quid besides the expectation and the fact fulfilling it; so if I expect x and x happens, something else is needed, e.g. something that happens in my head, to link expectation and fulfilment. But how do I know that it is the right something? Do I, on the same principle, need a fourth something? If so, we have an infinite regress, and I can never know that my expectation has been fulfilled. (We can always ask for a further description of any criterion given of meaning or fulfilment; which produces an infinite regress.)
10 Wittgenstein was aware of the fact that, in his Tractarian philosophy of logic, he had not made hard the crucial point that every proposition of logic must be recognizable as such from the symbol itself. As soon as we exceed the means of expression available in propositional logic problems arise that were clearly felt by Wittgenstein. Thus, for instance, in an undated letter to Russell Practically important as they may become, scientifically they have only a provisional meaning, so to speak, and, therefore, within a strict system, they do not have a place. These judgements, namely, only subsume part of the objects of a certain concept under another concept, and in such a way that it is left undetermined what part of the objects is intended. In reality a particular judgement can be advanced only when we actually know such S that are P. Always, also in practice, the source of the truth of a particular judgement lies in, and must be possible to trace to, the knowledge of quite specific S. Thus, it is an incomplete abbre: viation of the judgement "$1 and $2 and $3 etc. are P". Everywhere, when the S cannot be indicated individually (when one has forgotten them or trusted the statements of others), the judgement is not certain. In order to show its validity, one always has to return to the individual objects that constitute the subjectconcept "Some P", and thereby one replaces the particular judgement with a general. In the place of, for instance, the judgement "some metals are lighter than water" steps the other: "Potassium, sodium and lithium are lighter than water"; and only the latter has full scientific value.
German original:
So wichtig sie in der Praxis werden m6gen, wissenschaftlich haben sie nur gleichsam eine vorl~iufige Bedeutung, und daher in einem strengen System keinen Platz. Diese Urteile subsumieren n/~mlich nur einen Teil der Gegenst~inde eines bestimmten Begriffes unter einem andern Begriff, und zwar so, dass sie unbestimmt lassen, welcher Teil der Gegenst~inde gemeint ist. In Wirklichkeit l~isst sich ein partikulares Urteil nur aufstellen, wenn wir tats~ichlich solche S kennen, die P sind. Stets, auch in der Praxis, liegt der Quelle der Wahrheit eines partikul~iren Urteils in dem Wissen um ganz bestimmte S und muss sich bis zu diesen zurtickverfolgen lassen. Es ist also nur eine unvollkommene Abkiirzung f/it das Urteil "$1 und $2 und S 3 etc. sind P". Uberall, wo die S nicht einzeln angebbar sind (wo man sic etwa vergessen hat oder fremden Aussagen vertraut), ist auch das Urteil nicht gewiss. Um seine Gtiltigkeit darzutun, muss man stets auf die einzelnen Gegenst~inde zurtickgehen, die den Subjektbegriff "einige S" ausmachen, und damit ersetzt man eben das partikul~e Urteil durch ein allgemeines. An die Stelle etwa des Urteils "Einige Metalle sind leichter als Wasser" tritt das andere: "Kalium, Natrium und Lithium sind leichter als Wasser". Es w~re zu gendankenlos, von der allgemeinen Formel des Urteils
